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Abstract:  
According to contractualist theories in ethics, whether an action is wrong is 
determined by whether it could be justified to others on grounds no one could 
reasonably reject. Contractualists then think that reasonable rejectability of principles 
depends on the strength of the personal objections individuals can make to them. 
There is, however, a deep disagreement between contractualists concerning from 
which temporal perspective the relevant objections to different principles are to be 
made. Are they to be made on the basis of the prospects the principles give to different 
individuals ex ante or on the basis of the outcomes of the principles ex post? Both 
answers have been found to be problematic. The ex ante views make irrelevant 
information about personal identity morally significant and lead to objectionable ex 
ante rules, whereas ex post views lead to counterintuitive results in the so-called 
different harm and social risk imposition cases. The aim of this article is to provide a 
new synthesis of these views that can avoid the problems of the previous alternatives. 
I call the proposal ‘risk-acknowledging’ ex post contractualism. The crux of the view is 
to take into account in the comparisons of different objections both the realized harms 
and the risks under which individuals have to live.  
 
Key words: contractualism; social risk imposition; normative ethics; aggregation; ex 
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1. Introduction 
When T.M. Scanlon formulated a new contractualist ethical theory in What We Owe to 
Each Other1, some elements of that theory were constitutive features of the kind of 
                                               
1 See Scanlon (1998). Hereafter all unattributed references are to this work. 
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contractualism he had in mind. Scanlon argued that we should understand right 
actions in terms of what could be justified to others on grounds they could not 
reasonably reject (153–155). He then claimed that, in order to determine which actions 
are like that, we must first compare different moral principles we could all adopt 
together (195). He assumed that the adoption of different principles would create 
different kind of standpoints to individuals (203–204). What can be justified to others 
on grounds they could not reasonably reject is then a function of what kind of 
objections individuals can make to the principles from those standpoints (195).  
Scanlon stipulated that the relevant objections, which individuals can make to 
different moral principles, must be individual complaints (219).2 Any individual can 
object to the general adoption of a principle only on the basis of how the principle 
affects her personally. She cannot object to it on the basis of how the principle affects 
many different individuals simultaneously or on the basis of any impersonal values. 
This individualist restriction on the relevant objections makes Scanlon’s contractualism 
antiaggregative. It is motivated by the conviction that morality should protect us as 
individuals from being sacrificed for the sake of the utilitarian pursuit of the general 
good (235).  
This leads to another essential element of Scanlon’s view, the so-called Greater 
Burden Principle. According to it, ‘[i]t would be unreasonable…to reject a principle 
because it imposed a burden on you when every alternative would impose much 
                                               
2 For a discussion, see, e.g., Ridge (2001) and Parfit (2003). 
3 
 
greater burdens on others (Scanlon 1982, 111).’ The consequence of this principle is 
that the non-rejectable principles are such that there are more serious personal 
objections to all other alternatives. According to Scanlon’s contractualism then, an 
action is wrong if and only if it is forbidden by the non-rejectable principles, and right 
if and only if it is authorised by those principles. 
The previous outline captures the main essential features of Scanlonian 
contractualism. Yet, when Scanlon described the view, he also specified many other 
details of his own position. In the discussions that have followed, it has become 
evident that, if we change these details, the resulting views are still recognisably 
contractualist and Scanlonian even if they are different from Scanlon’s own view.  
One important current contractualist debate concerns the question of from 
which temporal perspective individuals are to make their objections to the moral 
principles which could be adopted to govern a given domain of behaviour. There are 
two answers to this question corresponding to ‘ex post’ and ‘ex ante’ contractualism.  
Scanlon himself originally explicitly formulated and defended a version of ex 
post contractualism (208–209; see also Scanlon (1982, 122–123).3 On this view, when we 
compare principles, we focus on ‘the foreseeable distribution of outcomes across 
individuals’, which they produce as a consequence of their adoption (Frick 2015, 185). 
We imagine a set of worlds that are otherwise identical to the actual world except that 
                                               
3 Other defenders of ex post contractualism include, e.g., Sophia Reibetanz Moreau (1998), Michael 
Otsuka (2015), Sune Holm (2018), and Korbinian Rüger (2018).  
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different moral principles have been adopted in them. As a result, individuals come 
to act in different ways in these worlds and this affects the lives they come to live. 
Individuals can then make objections to the principles under which they live on the 
basis of the personal burdens for which those principles have been causally 
responsible.  
Ex ante contractualists, in contrast, argue that individuals are to make the 
relevant objections from a perspective that, in temporal terms, looks at the relevant 
principles from a point in time before they have been adopted.4 From this perspective, 
individuals are to object to the principles on the basis of the prospects the adoption of 
those principles will give to them. Here, the objecting individuals do not know what 
the consequences of the relevant principles will be for them. The compared principles 
could, after all, harm or benefit any given individual in different ways depending on 
how things turn out. The resulting natural ignorance means that, when the contractors 
are putting forward their objections, they can discount both the potential harms and 
benefits resulting from a given principle by their improbability. 
This understanding of the relevant objections makes them similar to single-
person decisions under risk. For any principle, an individual can calculate the 
burdensomeness expectation of the adoption of that principle. The individual can first 
multiply the potential personal burdens by their likelihoods and then sum these 
                                               
4 For defences, see, e.g., Rahul Kumar (1999), Aaron James (2012), and Johann Frick (2015). Scanlon 
(2013) himself has also more recently endorsed the view. 
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products up. If the resulting burdensomeness expectation for the individual is high 
and there are alternative principles that do not give an equally high expectation for 
anyone, then the individual can reasonably reject the principle in question.  
The question of which form of contractualism we should accept continues to 
divide opinions. Sections §2 and §3 explain why this is the case. §2 begins from two 
main arguments which the ex post contractualists have used both as objections to ex 
ante contractualism and as support for their own view. These are the Argument from 
Irrelevant Information and the Problem of Ex Ante Rules. §3 then introduces the key 
problem of the ex post views.  This argument suggests that the ex post versions of 
contractualism have objectionable moral consequences in aggregation and social risk 
imposition cases.  
The rest of this article then outlines a new form of contractualism that (i) 
borrows elements from both ex post and ex ante contractualism and (ii) avoids the main 
objections to those views. I call this view risk-acknowledging ex post contractualism. This 
view agrees with the ex post contractualists that individuals are to make their 
objections to different principles on the basis of how those principles have affected 
them. Yet, it also agrees with the ex ante contractualists that individuals can object to 
the principles under which they live on the basis of the risks, which those principles 
impose on them. After outlining this proposal, §4 argues that this view is immune to 
the ex ante contractualists objections to ex post contractualism. It also explains how the 
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view still has the same theoretical virtues as the more traditional forms of ex post 
contractualism. 
Finally, §5 discusses ‘mixed’ social risk imposition cases, which Johann Frick 
(2014, §7–§9) argues remain a problem for ex ante forms of contractualism. Frick 
suggests that these cases show that contractualism cannot capture what it is for actions 
to be right and so the view should rather be understood as a view of one particular 
type of right-makers. I will argue that the new risk-acknowledging ex post 
contractualism can support our intuitions in these cases too and so at least these cases 
do not force the contractualists to seek a less unified understanding of right and 
wrong.  
2. The Arguments for Ex Post Contractualism and against Ex Ante 
Contractualism 
In order to outline the Argument from Irrelevant Information, I will borrow a case 
from Sophia Reibetanz Moreau. She asks us to consider the following case (Reibetanz 
Moreau 1998, 302): 
The Unexploded Mine. – You are in small in a small village just after the end of a 
war, when you hear that a certain field near the village is known to contain an 
unexploded mine, though it is not known where in the field the mine is. One 
hundred laborers from the village are about to begin tilling the field. They will 
work at enough distance from each other that if one encounters the mine, he 
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alone will be injured; but one of them is certain to encounter the mine at some 
time if it is not removed, and that one will be seriously injured. You have a 
special device that enables you to detect and remove mines without sustaining 
any injury. But weather conditions are bad; and you are weak. So you know that 
if you go out into the field with the mine-detection device, you will come down 
with pneumonia. Unfortunately, no one else in the area has the knowledge 
necessary to operate the device. 
Reibetanz stipulates that the damage caused to the one laborer who encounters the 
mine is ten times as great as the harm caused to you by pneumonia (ibid.). Let us then 
consider this case through the lenses of ex ante contractualism. 
We must first locate the objections which you and the laborers can make to the 
‘Use the device!’ and ‘Stay in bed!’ principles. Your objection to the former principle 
is that it will give a fully certain prospect of pneumonia and the harm it causes. Yet, 
according to ex ante contractualism, the laborers could not make equally serious 
personal objections to the ‘Stay in bed!’ principle from the ex ante perspective. One of 
the laborers will come to bear the ten-fold burden caused by the exploding mine but 
even he or she has to discount this burden by its antecedent improbability of 1%. 
Given the Greater Burden Principle, ex ante contractualism then makes it 
counterintuitively impossible for anyone to reasonably reject the ‘Stay in Bed!’ 
principle given that the only alternative to it would be responsible for even worse 
personal prospects for one individual.  
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According to the Argument from Irrelevant Information, the previous 
reasoning fails to acknowledge that we know from the beginning that one individual 
will be harmed by the mine. We know that there is a luckless individual – it’s just that 
we do not yet know the identity of that person. Sophia Reibetanz Moreau (1999, 304) 
then argues that, as long as we know that there is a luckless individual who will be 
harmed by a given principle, this person’s objection to the principle has to be based 
on the full magnitude of the harm it will cause to her. This is because the identity of 
this person is ethically irrelevant information – not knowing this identity is no reason to 
discount the objection of this person by the relevant ex ante improbability.5  
There is also a more general theoretical concern behind this objection to ex ante 
contractualism. This is the worry that understanding the relevant objections in terms 
of individuals making choices under risk behind a hypothetical veil of ignorance 
imposed by the ex ante perspective ‘fails to give each person the separate and 
individual concern that she is due’ (Frick 2015, 190). In order to arrive at genuine moral 
principles, the argument goes, we must be able to justify our actions to each agent 
from her own point of view, ‘without any artificial informational restrictions’ (ibid.). 
Scanlon himself rejected ex ante contractualism for a different reason, which can 
be called the Problem of Ex Ante Rules (208–209).6 Ex ante rules are, by definition, rules 
                                               
5 In addition to Reibetanz Moreau (1999, 304), for explanations of this argument see also Frick (2015, 
184–185), Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve (2013), Holm (2018, 233–234), and Otsuka (2015). 
6 For discussions of this problem, see also, e.g., Ashford (2003, §4), Frick (2015, 201–203), and Kumar 
(2015, §3). 
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the adoption of which is initially in everyone’s interests even if these rules will after 
the adoption benefit some people but greatly burden others. One example of such a 
rule would require us to choose at random a tiny minority of people to become 
involuntary subjects of painful and dangerous medical experiments. The adoption of 
this rule could significantly advance medical knowledge and, as a result, the rule 
could come to benefit us all. The problem is that the ex ante versions of contractualism 
seem to make this type of objectionable rules not reasonably rejectable. 
To see this, consider the adoption of the previous rule from an ex ante 
perspective. From this perspective, it’s not clear that you would have reason to object 
to the rule. After all, if that rule were adopted, your well-being expectation would be 
good. You would be likely to benefit from the advances in medical knowledge and 
you probably would not need to suffer the harms of the experimentation yourself. You 
would therefore be able to discount those harms by their improbability, which would 
leave you with no reason to object to the rule in question. The defenders of ex post 
contractualism, however, argue that this is the wrong result. After all, we do not think 
that making medical experiments on an unwilling minority is the right thing to do.7 
                                               
7 There are also other objections to ex ante contractualism. For example, it can be argued that the view 
makes the distinction between unidentified doomed children and identified doomed children morally 
significant in an objectionable way. See Rüger (2018, 245–251). 
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3. The Argument for Ex Ante Contractualism and against Ex Post 
Contractualism 
The arguments of the previous section appeared to support the ex post view. However, 
that view too has its problems. Most problematically, ex post contractualism leads to 
wrong conclusions regarding which actions are right and wrong. Here I will focus 
only on the so-called the different harm cases and the social risk imposition cases.8 
In the former cases, we must choose between saving one individual from an 
extremely serious burden (e.g., death) and saving a group of people (e.g., hundred) 
from a slightly less serious burden (e.g., the loss of a limb, blindness, or paralysis) 
(239). Ex post contractualism seems to entail counter-intuitively that we should save 
the one person because she has a stronger objection to the ‘Save many!’ principle that 
any one of the group members have to the ‘Save the one!’ principle. 9 Ex ante 
contractualists can, in contrast, argue that, no one could reasonably reject the ‘Save 
many!’ principle given its general adoption gives a lower burdensomeness 
expectation for every individual. From the ex ante perspective, it is unlikely that you 
                                               
8 I set the previously much-discussed same harm cases in which we need to decide between saving one 
and saving many aside for reasons of space. Scanlon (1998, 232) originally tried to deal with these cases 
with the ‘tie break argument’ according to which each member of the group has an additional personal 
objection based on the fact, if the group is not saved, their presence makes no moral difference. This 
response has been both criticised (Otsuka 2000) and defended (Hirose 2001). The risk-acknowledging 
version of ex post contractualism introduced below can deal with the same harm cases in the same way 
as the different harm cases without needing to rely on the tie break argument. 
9 For discussions, see e.g., Norcross (2002), Parfit (2003, §3) and Hooker (2003, 72–75),  
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end up being the one person in this type of a case rather than a member of the larger 
group.  
The social risk imposition cases ground a similar objection to ex post 
contractualism. Consider the following case from Johann Frick (2015, 181): 
Mass Vaccination (Unknown Victims): One million young children are threatened 
by a terrible virus, which is certain to kill all of them if we do nothing. We must 
choose between producing one of the two vaccines (capacity constraints 
prevent us from producing both): 
• Vaccine 1 is certain to save every child’s life, However, the vaccine will not 
provide complete protection against the virus. If a child receives vaccine 1, the 
virus is certain to paralyze one of the child’s legs, so that he or she will walk on 
crutches for the rest of his or her life. 
• Vaccine 2 is risky. It gives every child a 999/1000 chance of surviving the 
virus completely unharmed. However, for every child there is a 1/1000 chance 
that the Vaccine 2 will be completely ineffective and the child will be killed by 
the virus. (Assume that the outcomes for different children are probabilistically 
independent.) Call the children who end up dying luckless children.  
Whichever of the two vaccines we choose to produce will be administered to 
all one million children. 
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Intuitively, we ought to produce the Vaccine 2. After all, it is morally acceptable to 
immunize children against serious non-fatal diseases even when there is a known 
chance of fatal side effects to some children from the immunisation itself. 
Yet, ex post contractualism seems to lead to the wrong conclusion here.10 Again, 
we must compare the objections that different individuals can make to Vaccine 1 and 
Vaccine 2 from a perspective from which the consequences of those policies have 
become evident. This means that the personal objections of the luckless children to 
Vaccine 2 (death) will be more serious than the personal objections to Vaccine 1 
(paralysis of one leg). This makes the principle requiring the production of Vaccine 1 
non-rejectable and so ex post contractualism seems to require counterintuitively us to 
produce Vaccine 1.11  
Ex ante contractualism can, however, avoid the previous objectionable 
conclusion. From the ex ante perspective, no child has a reason to object to the 
production of the Vaccine 2 given that ‘escaping certain paralysis in one leg for the 
rest of her life is worth a 1/1000 risk of death’ (Frick 2015, 187). Hence both the different 
                                               
10 Before Frick, many others too had argued that ex post contractualism threatens to be too confining by 
not permitting many intuitively permissible socially productive activities such as aviation and bridge 
building (Ashford 2003, 298–300; Fried 2012; James 2012, §2; Kumar 2015, §4; Lenman 2008, §12). The 
examples used and the problems they pose are structurally identical to Frick’s case and so I won’t 
discuss these arguments separately. Scanlon himself tried to deal with those case by relying on the idea 
of reasonable level of precautions (209; for a critical discussion, see Ashford (2003, 299) and Lenman 
(2008, 114)). The versions of risk-acknowledging ex post contractualism introduced below can deal with 
those cases exactly in the same way as with Frick’s case (see fn. 20 below). 
11 Frick also argues that ex post contractualism cannot distinguish between the objections, which the 
luckless children have in the previous case, and the objections which the doomed children have in the 
cases in certain identified group of children will die because the relevant vaccine is not effective for 
them (Frick 2015, 200; see also Rüger (2018, 241–242)). The problem is that the latter children have 
intuitively a more serious complaint to the policies that will disadvantage them.  
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harm and the social risk imposition suggest that we should accept ex ante 
contractualism instead of ex post contractualism. 
4. Risk-acknowledging Ex Post Contractualism 
4.1 What Then? Two Alternatives 
Contractualists then face a dilemma. They must choose between ex post and ex ante 
contractualism and yet both views are problematic (James 2012, 265). This means that 
contractualists must choose between two strategies (Fried 2012, 46).12 The first is to 
insist that the previous problems of ex post contractualism really are a sufficient reason 
to accept an ex ante view. After this, these contractualists must try to provide a 
response to the Argument from Irrelevant Information and the Problem of Ex Ante 
Rules (see §2 above). This is Johann Frick’s (2015) strategy. 
Frick first challenges the main arguments for the key controversial premise in 
the Argument from Irrelevant Information according to which the ‘fact that we cannot 
know the identities of the luckless children is irrelevant to the question of whether 
selecting the Vaccine 2 is justifiable to each person’ (Frick 2015, 194). According to 
Frick, the key motivation for this premise can be called the Argument from Certain 
Loss. This argument claims that we must take the unlucky child’s objection to Vaccine 
                                               
12 There are also a number of mixed strategies according to which justifiability to each person is a 
function of both ex ante and ex post objections which individuals can make. For different versions of 
these hybrid views and their problems, see Fried (2012, §3). 
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2 into account in its full magnitude because it can be ‘augmented by the fact that it 
was certain that someone would be burdened’ (Frick 2015, 195).  
Frick’s concern is that motivating the central premise of the Argument from 
Irrelevant Information in this way would imply an odd asymmetry between social 
risk-imposition cases like Mass Vaccination (Unknown Victims) and single-person 
gambles. Consider a child, Clara, who must choose between Vaccine 1 which is certain 
to save her life at the cost of one of her legs becoming paralyzed and Vaccine 2 which 
will give a 999/1000 chance of surviving unharmed and 1/1000 chance of being killed. 
Here, it would make sense for Clara to choose Vaccine 2. Even if she were unlucky, 
she would have no reason to complain. 
Ex post contractualists are then forced to claim that, even if Clara cannot object 
to having chosen the Vaccine 2 when she is unlucky, the unlucky child in the social 
risk case will have a legitimate complaint to Vaccine 2 because, even if she hadn’t been 
unlucky, someone else would have died. According to Frick, not only is this oddly 
asymmetric, but it also threatens to violate the contractualist individualist restriction 
(2014, 196). Even if we are not aggregating the objections of different individuals in 
the same world, we are aggregating them across different worlds. This is why Frick 
thinks that the central premise of the Argument from Irrelevant Information fails and 
so that argument against ex ante contractualism has no force.13 
                                               
13 For a response defending the Argument from Certain Loss, see Otsuka (2015) and Holm (2018, §4–
§5). 
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Frick’s (2015, §4, see also Lenman (2008, §7 and §9) and Kumar (2015, §3)) 
response to the Problem of Ex Ante Rules argues that all contractualists should endorse 
a ‘decomposition test’. When we consider a principle that governs complex activities 
that consist of going through different stages of many voluntary actions, the rule can 
be non-rejectable only if the relevant voluntary actions at every stage are justifiable to 
each person at that time. Frick then argues that the intuitively objectionable ex ante 
rules will not pass this test. For example, the human experiment principle of §3 
certainly includes a stage – conducting painful medical experiments on unwilling 
subjects – that cannot be justified to everyone at the time when those actions are done.  
Unfortunately, here, I have no space to investigate whether the previous ex ante 
contractualist responses to the Argument from Irrelevant Information and the 
Problem of Ex Ante Rules are successful. Instead, I will focus on the second potential 
strategy of responding to the dilemma described above. This second alternative begins 
from accepting the basic crux of ex post contractualism. It then tries to develop a form 
of ex post contractualism that could avoid the extensional objections to ex post 
contractualism discussed in §3. It is this line of argument that I will pursue next. After 
this, in §5, I will return to the question of which of the two strategies is more 
successful.14 
                                               
14 Broadly speaking, in addition to Frick, the first strategy has been pursued by James (2012) and Kumar 
(2015). Likewise, the second strategy has been pursued in different ways by Otsuka (2015) and Holm 
(2008). 
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4.2 The Proposal 
We can begin from the thought that, in the contractualist framework, what is right and 
wrong is a function of on what grounds individuals can object to different moral 
principles and how good objections those objections are taken to be. Therefore, if you 
as a contractualist change your view of those considerations and the strengths of the 
objections they ground, you will come to different conclusions about which actions 
are right and wrong. 
§1 above drew a distinction between the essential features of Scanlonian 
contractualism and the other details of Scanlon’s own position. Scanlon himself 
outlined a theory of which considerations count as personal objections to different 
principles and the examples he uses also give a good idea of how strong objections 
those considerations are taken to support (213–241). Yet, if we make changes to this 
theory, we will get a different theory of which actions are right and wrong. The 
resulting view will be contractualist and Scanlonian in spirit but just not Scanlon’s 
own view.  
According to Scanlon’s own view, the considerations that ground objections to 
different moral principles must be ‘generic reasons’ to make those objections (219).15 
These reasons cannot be based on the idiosyncratic interests or features of actual 
individuals but, rather, they must be based on what reasons anyone occupying a 
                                               
15 For explanations of Scanlon’s view of the relevant objections, see, e.g., Ashford (2003, 277–279), James 
(2012, 267) and Kumar (2015, 41–42). 
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particular position would have ‘in virtue of their situation, characterized in general 
terms’ (204). As examples of generic reasons, Scanlon lists bodily injury, inability to 
rely on the assurances of others, and not having control over one’s own body (204).  
Let me make two observations of this theory of the relevant objections. Firstly, 
many of the previous considerations are tied to an individual’s level of well-being and 
so Scanlon recognises that the way in which a given principle lowers someone’s well-
being often gives that person a legitimate ground for objecting to that principle. 
Scanlon, however, accepts that there are also other grounds for making legitimate 
objections and he argues that well-being does not provide a master currency for 
evaluating the strength of different objections (214–215).  
Secondly, the ex ante contractualists’ objections to ex post contractualism (§3) are 
based on Scanlon’s own view of the considerations on the basis of which individuals 
can object to the compared principles. This is because the assumed generic reasons to 
object to different principles from the ex post perspective are in the relevant examples 
considerations such as that the principles leads to someone’s death or to the paralysis 
of a child’s leg.  
Here I then want to outline a version of ex post contractualism that makes only 
one addition to Scanlon’s account of the potential objections to different moral 
principles. My proposal therefore recognises all the considerations that Scanlon 
acknowledged: all the same generic reasons that can ground the relevant objections. 
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Yet, in addition, it also recognises just one new set of generic reasons on the basis of 
which individuals can also make objections to different moral principles. 
I borrow this new set of potential objections from the ex ante contractualists. 
They, after all, stipulate that individuals can, from the ex ante perspective, object to 
different moral principles on the grounds that those principles impose a significant 
risk on them. My suggestion is that the ex post contractualists too should accept that 
individuals can object to moral principles on the grounds that those principles require 
them to live in circumstances in which significant risks are imposed on them.16 The 
only difference is that, according to this proposal, individuals can object to the moral 
principles they have lived under on the basis of risks from their ex post perspective 
from which the consequences of those principles are evident. Let me borrow James 
Lenman’s (2008, §11) simple example to illustrate this thought.  
Imagine that Jones plays Russian roulette on Smith. He puts in a bullet, spins 
the chamber and pulls the trigger whilst aiming at Smith. If the gun does not fire, what 
kind of a moral complaint can Smith make to what Jones did from the ex post 
perspective? He cannot complain about the fact that Jones shot him – that never 
                                               
16 Lenman (2008, §13) suggests a different synthesis of ex ante and ex post contractualism. Lenman’s 
proposal is that, even if objections are to be evaluated from ex post perspective, even from this 
perspective we are to consider whether you can object to what someone did to you when that action is 
understood from the agent’s ex ante epistemic perspective. Understood in this way, we can discount 
many resulting harms as objections by their improbability. This differs the view outlined below as that 
proposal does not discount any realized harms by their improbability, but rather it considers living 
under a risk as a ground for additional objection ex post. 
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happened. Rather, Smith has a legitimate complaint to Jones’s action on the grounds 
that it imposed a serious risk on him.  
Consider then a case in which the gun fires and Smith dies. Here it seems that 
Smith can complain on two grounds. He can both object to the fact that Jones shot him 
and, yet, he can also complain on the same basis as in the previous scenario. He can 
object to the fact such a serious risk was imposed on him. This objection does not go 
away merely because the risk is realized in this case. Of course, we might think that 
Smith’s risk-based objection is much weaker than the one based on his death, but it is 
a legitimate complaint nonetheless. And, even if the previous example is stylized, 
there are corresponding real life cases. For example, the main objection to drunk 
driving from the ex post perspective is that, even when no one was harmed, the driver 
imposed a serious risk on others. 
The more serious risk is imposed on someone, the more strongly that person 
can then object to it.17 I assume that the seriousness of a risk depends on the 
seriousness of the relevant harms that can result from the risk and their likelihoods. 
The more serious risks then ground stronger objections to the principles that would 
allow imposing those risks. Risk-acknowledging ex post contractualism is then the 
view which (i) compares the personal objections to different moral principles from the 
                                               
17 It could be argued that this makes it ever so slightly more wrong to shoot someone at point blank 
compared to playing Russian roulette on them when this leads to death. The main objection both 
victims can make is that they have been killed. However, both can also object to the fact that they were 
put under a serious risk. In the case of shooting someone at point blank, this risk is more serious given 
that the likelihood of the other person dying is higher than in the Russian roulette case. 
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ex post perspective, (ii) accepts all of Scanlon’s the generic reasons to object to different 
principles, and (iii) adds that individuals can also object to the principles they have 
lived under on the basis of the risks those principles have imposed on them. In the 
next sub-section I will then attempt to show how this view can deal with some of the 
objections to the previous forms of ex post contractualism. 
4.3 Risk-Acknowledging Ex Post Contractualism and the problems of the previous 
alternatives 
This final sub-section first attempts to show that many versions of previous proposal 
can come to exactly the same conclusions about the different harm and social risk 
imposition cases as ex ante contractualism (§3).  If correct, this would mean that risk-
acknowledging ex post contractualism is immune to the ex ante contractualists’ 
objections to ex post views. The rest of this section then argues that risk-acknowledging 
ex post contractualism also retains the alleged advantages of the traditional forms of 
ex post contractualism (§2). 
Let us first recall two important elements of Scanlon’s contractualism. Firstly, 
even if Scanlon’s contractualism is antiaggregative and so does not allow combining 
personal objections to even stronger interpersonal aggregate objections, Scanlon’s 
view allows intrapersonal aggregation of different personal objections (237).18 An 
individual can object to a principle on many different grounds – on the basis of 
                                               
18 See also Lenman (2008, 108), Fried (2012, 58) and James (2012, 282). 
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different burdens, which the principle imposes on her. When the agent is in this 
position, her objections combine into an even stronger intrapersonal aggregate 
objection.  
Secondly, the principles evaluated in Scanlon’s framework do not govern just 
individual situations. Rather, each principle is supposed to govern a whole range of 
cases – they are to guide agents in a given domain of behaviour more generally (202–
203).19 Thus, whatever the principles are that determine what we are to do in 
Unexploded Mine and Mass Vaccination (Unknown Victims), these principles also 
govern many other situations in which the claims of individuals and groups conflict. 
One reason for insisting on this generality is that it allows us to consider also the wider 
consequences of the general adoption of different principles, for example the so-called 
expectation effects (203). Due to the general adoption of the relevant general 
principles, not only do individuals act in different ways in specific situations, but 
people also come to take different precautions, which affects the kinds of lives they 
will live. 
Here is then how I will proceed. I will first outline how risk-acknowledging ex 
post contractualism can deal with one paradigmatic different harm case and one 
paradigmatic social risk imposition case. I will then explain how we can formulate 
different versions of the view some of which will be co-extensive to whatever the right 
principles governing all these kinds of cases are. If this is right, then the outlined view 
                                               
19 See also Ashford (2003, 278), Lenman (2008, 108 and §14), Fried (2012, 58) and Kumar (2015, 40–41). 
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can avoid the existing objections to ex post contractualism (§3). I will then conclude 
this section by returning to the advantages of ex post contractualism discussed in §2.  
So, return to the case in which you can save either one individual from death 
or a large group of people from paralysis.20 To govern cases like this, we could adopt 
either the ‘Save the one!’ principle or the ‘Save the many!’ principle. Because we are 
considering the consequences of these principles ex post, we can assume that we know 
the identities of the individuals who will be affected by these principle in different 
ways. So, let me call the individual who will die if the group is saved ‘Alex’ and one 
of the individuals who is paralyzed if Alex is saved ‘George’. 
We can then represent the consequences of the general adoption of these 
principles with the following table: 
Principle adopted: Alex George 
Save the one! • No harm. 
• Risk n. 
• Paralysis 
• Risk n. 
Save the many! • Death. 
• Risk m. 
• No harm. 
• Risk m. 
  
                                               
20 Note that this case is the one described by Scanlon (239) and discussed in the very beginning of section 
3 on page 9. This case has two important features. Firstly, the consequences of both actions in the 
relevant situation are fully known and, secondly, if we save the one individual from death then no 
harm is caused to the members of the group whereas if we save the group then no harm is caused to 
the one individual. The social risk imposition case Mass Vaccination (Unknown Victims) (see sec. 3 
above) differs from this case in these two respects. For a discussion of that case, see below.   
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Here is how to read this table. The rows ‘Save the one!’ and ‘Save the many!’ 
correspond to two distinct scenarios: to one in which the ‘Save the one!’ principle has 
been adopted (the first row) and to one in which the ‘Save the many!’ principle has 
been adopted (the second row). The columns ‘Alex’ and ‘George’ then indicate what 
happens to Alex and George in those scenarios. In the circumstances in which the 
‘Save the one!’ principle has been universally adopted, Alex gets saved (and so he is 
not harmed at all) whereas George ends up fully paralysed as a member of the larger 
group. In contrast, in the circumstances in which the ‘Save the many!’ principle has 
been adopted Alex dies whereas George and the other members of the group are not 
harmed at all.  
In this case, I also assume that both Alex and George face the same risk n when 
they live under the ‘Save the one!’ principle (I’ll return to this risk shortly). Likewise, 
the same risk m is imposed on both when they live under the ‘Save the many!’ 
principle. This means that George has the most serious intrapersonally aggregated 
personal objection to ‘Save the one!’ based on both his paralysis and the risk n that 
was imposed on him by that principle throughout his life-time, whereas Alex has the 
most serious objection to ‘Save the many!’ based on his death and the risk m, which 
was imposed on him. After all, Alex can object to ‘Save the one!’ only on the basis of 
risk n and George to ‘Save the many!’ on the basis of risk m. 
How are we then to understand risks n and m? I first assume that every 
individual who lives under the previous principles have exactly the same chance of 
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getting into a situation governed by those principles. These are the cases in which we 
must weigh the claims of individuals and different sized groups against one another. 
For example, one example of such cases is the health care context given that providers 
must often decide between whether to use their resources for saving the lives of few 
individuals with costly treatments and improving the health of the vast majority of 
people with less expensive means. Given that this probability is the same for each 
individual under both principles and presumably quite high overall, I will ignore it in 
the following. 
Risk m and n can then be understood to have two components that determine 
how serious those risks are.21 Firstly, there is the relevant harm. Under the ‘Save the 
many!’ principle this harm element of risk m is either an individual’s death or some 
other very serious harm. Under ‘Save the one!’, the harm element of risk n is, in 
contrast, a set of slightly lesser harms (such as paralysis in the case above) from which 
the members of the group will not be saved in the relevant cases. 
                                               
21 Here I follow Kumar (2015, 43–44). Below, I consider only the base-line risks which we all have qua 
members of the general population. As Kumar points out (ibid., especially fn. 27), different individuals 
can, of course, also have additional risks qua members of more specific reference classes. Yet, taking 
these additional risks into account would not change the conclusions below substantially (but see 
Kumar (2015, 45–47) for a discussion. This additional feature of the risk-acknowledging forms of ex post 
contractualism also enables these views to recognise the difference between the luckless children in 
Mass Vaccination (Unknown Victims) and the doomed children in the slightly modified version in 
which certain identified group of children will die because the Vaccine 2 is not effective for them (see 
Frick (2015, 200), Rüger (2018, 241–242) and fn. 11 above). The defenders of these views can claim that, 
even if both children die in the corresponding cases, a more serious risk is imposed on the latter and so 
intrapersonally aggregated objections which the doomed children have to Vaccine 2 are stronger than 
the corresponding objections of the luckless children. 
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The second element of m and n is a probability measure, which I understand 
in terms of a frequency of how often any individual is, on average, either the lone 
individual (or a member of the smaller group) or a member of the larger group 
threatened by the slightly less serious harm.22 Given the numbers involved, it is always 
vastly more probable that a given individual ends up being a member of the larger 
group in this type of a case rather than the one individual or a member of the much 
smaller group. 
We are then in a position to characterize the risks m and n. Risk m under which 
everyone lives under the ‘Save the one!’ principle consists of a very high probability 
of ending up being a member of a larger group who will come to suffer a slightly less 
serious harm than from which the individual (or a small group) is saved as a result of 
that principle. In contrast, risk n under which everyone lives under the ‘Save the 
many!’ principle consists of a very small probability of ending up being the one 
individual (or a member of a small group) who will not be saved from the more 
serious harm. Risk m thus consists of a much higher probability of suffering almost as 
serious harm whereas risk n consists of a considerably lower probability of suffering 
a slightly more serious harm. As a result, we must conclude that m is a more serious 
risk than n. Because of this, from the ex post perspective individuals have a 
                                               
22 Others who have accepted the relevant probabilities in terms of a frequency measure in this debate 
include Fried (2012, 50) and Kumar (2015, 43–44, including fn. 26 on other alternatives). 
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significantly stronger objection to risk m being imposed on them than they have to the 
imposition of the less serious risk n. 
We can then intrapersonally aggregate George’s different personal objections 
to ‘Save the one!’ principle and likewise Alex’s personal objections to ‘Save the many!’ 
principle. George’s objection to the former principle consists of both paralysis and the 
imposition of the serious risk m, whereas Alex’s objection to the latter principle 
consists of death and a much less serious risk n. Let us then assume that there is some 
measure of how much more serious objection to a principle death grounds compared 
to the objection based on paralysis. Let this difference between the two objections be 
x units of ‘objection strength’.  
Consider then the versions of risk-acknowledging ex post contractualism 
according to which individuals can make strong objections to principles on the basis 
of the serious risks those principles impose on them. Such views can argue that 
George’s objection to ‘Save the one!’ based on risk n is so much stronger than Alex’s 
risk m-based objection to ‘Save the many!’ that the difference between these objections 
is greater than x units of objection strength. As result, these views will entail that 
George’s intrapersonally aggregated objection (paralysis and risk m) to the principles 
that require saving Alex is stronger than Alex’s objection to saving the group (death 
and risk n). These versions of risk-acknowledging ex post contractualism can thus 
agree with the defenders of ex ante contractualism about what ought to be done in the 
previous case. 
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Similar things can be said about Mass Vaccination (Unknown Victims). From 
the ex post perspective, let us call ‘Ben’ one of the children whose leg is paralysed by 
Vaccine 1 but who will be survive fully unharmed if he is given the Vaccine 2. 
Likewise, let us call one of the luckless children who dies in the Vaccine 2 scenario 
‘Stephen’ (note that Stephen survives if he takes the Vaccine 1 but his leg too will be 
paralysed in that case). We can then again represent the outcomes of the two principles 
in this way: 
 Ben Stephen 
Vaccine 1 • Paralysed leg 
• Risk p 
• Paralysed leg 
• Risk p 
Vaccine 2 • No harm 
• Risk q 
• Death 
• Risk q 
 
The columns again here specify two circumstances in which two different moral 
principles governing the same situation have been adopted. Under the Vaccine 1 
principle, Vaccine 1, which paralyzes every child who takes it, is produced and so 
under this principle both Ben and Stephen have to suffer the harm of one of their legs 
ending up being paralysed. In contrast, when the Vaccine 2 is produced under the 
Vaccine 2 principle, Ben is one of the majority of children who survives the virus 
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completely unharmed whereas Stephen is one of the unlucky children who dies as a 
result of taking the Vaccine 2. 
Risks p and q are then imposed on individuals by the adoption of the general 
principles that would require the production of Vaccine 1 and Vaccine 2 respectively. 
These risks again have two elements that determine how serious they are: a 
probability element and a harm element. We know how the harm elements compare. 
The harm element is more serious in risk q. The adoption of a principle that requires 
Vaccine 2 to be produced entails that some children will die whereas the adoption of 
a Vaccine 1 principle leads to every child having a paralysed leg. We also, however, 
know that the probability of harm is much, much higher when you live under the 
Vaccine 1 principles. After all, these principles mean that the likelihood, for any one 
individual, of suffering the slightly less serious harm is 1 – i.e., full certainty. In 
contrast, for any one individual, including Ben, the probability (understood again as 
a frequency measure) that he or she will experience the more serious harm (death, in 
this case) under the Vaccine 2 principles is much smaller. In the case described by 
Frick, this probability is 0.001.  
This means that risk p under which all individuals live under the Vaccine 1 
principles (p=1, harm=paralysis of a leg) is a much more serious risk than the risk q 
under which all individuals live under the Vaccine 2 principles (p=0.001, harm=death). 
Let the difference between how strong objections death and paralysis of a leg ground 
be in this case y units of objection strength. We can then compare the intrapersonally 
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aggregated objections that Ben and Stephen have to the Vaccine 1 and Vaccine 2 
principles respectively.  
Let us focus on the versions of risk-acknowledging ex post contractualism 
according to which individuals have strong objections to the principles under which 
they live when those principles impose serious risks on them. On such views, Ben’s 
combined objection based on the paralysis of his leg and the much more serious risk 
p will be a stronger objection to Vaccine 1 than Stephen’s objection to Vaccine 2 based 
on his death and having to live under the minute risk q.23 This is because, on these 
views, the difference between the risk-based objections is greater than y units of 
objection strength and so paralysis of a leg and the much more serious risk p combine 
to a stronger objection than death and the small risk q. This means that these versions 
of ex post contractualism can agree with the defenders of the ex ante views concerning 
what we ought to do in Mass Vaccination (Unknown Victims). 
I have then shown that there are versions of risk-acknowledging ex post 
contractualism that can lead to the intuitively correct moral conclusions at least in the 
individual different harm and social risk imposition cases discussed above. Are there 
also versions that will have plausible consequences in all similar cases? Here I want to 
suggest that there are no matter what those plausible consequences turn out to be.  
                                               
23 In fact, as the table above shows, Stephen himself has the same objection to Vaccine 1 as Ben given 
that both suffer the same harm of paralysis of a leg and risk p under that principle. This means that 
Stephen’s own objection to Vaccine 1 is stronger on this view than his own objection to Vaccine 2. 
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We must first recognise that there are a range of plausible first-order ethical 
plausible views in this context. For reasons of simplicity, I will focus only on the 
different harm cases (even if exactly the same considerations will apply also to the 
social risk imposition cases). Some people think that, in the different harm cases, we 
should save the larger group only if the group has very many members (thousands, 
millions, …) and the members of the group are threatened by almost exactly as serious 
harm as the one individual. Others think that we should save the group even if it only 
has few members and they are threatened by a significantly less serious harm. And, 
of course, there is a whole spectrum of different views between these two extremes, 
depending on how aggregative or antiaggregative your moral convictions are. 
Yet, whatever view we take from the previous spectrum, there will exist a 
version of risk-acknowledging ex post contractualism that will be extensionally 
equivalent to it. This is because we can create different versions of that position by 
making different stipulations of how strong objections to a moral principle different 
risks ground. If we take a view according to which even the most serious risks do not 
ground very strong objections, we end up with risk-acknowledging ex post 
contractualism that is co-extensive with the view that requires an extremely large 
group and almost as serious harm for the larger group to be favoured. In contrast, a 
view according to which even less serious risks ground significant objections entail 
that the groups that ought to be saved can be relatively small and the harms that 
threaten them significantly less serious. And, again, there will be a whole spectrum of 
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views of how strong objections risks ground between the previous two extremes. This 
spectrum of views of how strong objections risks ground and the versions of risk-
acknowledging ex post contractualism they ground will match exactly the extension of 
the previous spectrum of moral convictions concerning when we are to favour the 
larger groups.  
This means that the ex ante contractualists cannot object to risk-acknowledging 
ex post contractualism on the same grounds as they objected to the previous forms of 
ex post contractualism.24 Whatever they think the right principles to govern the 
different harm and social risk imposition cases are, there will be versions of risk-
acknowledging ex post contractualism that can justify those very principles. As a 
result, the objections to ex post contractualism described in §3 no longer apply.  
Despite this difference, the outlined risk-acknowledging versions of ex post 
contractualism still retain the advantages of the previous ex post views (see §2). Every 
individual’s objections to the principles he or she lives under are taken into account 
in full magnitude from the ex post perspective and so no objection is discounted by its 
antecedent improbability. This is why the outlined proposal can agree that such 
discounting would let irrelevant information about the identity of the relevant 
                                               
24 The objection to ex post contractualism according to which the view is too confining by ruling out 
socially productive activities such as aviation can be responded to in the same way (see fn. 9 above). 
First, it can be argued that these activities too save lives and prevent other serious burdens (Holm 2018, 
241; James 2012, 272). It can then be argued that living under principles that forbid these activities both 
causes those very harms to some individuals and also imposes a more serious risk of harms to them 
too. Given that the rules that permit these activities cause similar burdens but not as serious risks to 
anyone (Kumar 2015, 48), these principles cannot be reasonably rejected. 
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individuals have too significant moral consequences. The proposed view thus is able 
to give each real individual the genuine concern he or she is due. 
Likewise, the proposed view will not support the implausible ex ante rules. 
Take the rule discussed in §2 according to which we should conduct medical 
experiments on randomly chosen subjects to advance medical knowledge. In a 
scenario in which this principle has not been adopted, some individuals can object to 
the fact they were not saved from being killed by a certain medical condition because 
the relevant advances in medical knowledge based on involuntary human 
experiments had not been made. These individuals can also object to the fact that they 
lived under a small risk that they would have to suffer this particular avoidable harm.  
In contrast, in the circumstances in which the previous rule has been adopted, 
the involuntary subjects of the painful medical experiments have the strongest 
personal objections to the principle under which they live. They can object to the harm 
and pain caused to them by the relevant experiments, the violation of their autonomy, 
and also to the risk imposed on them by the whole system.25 As long as the risk-
acknowledging ex post contractualists acknowledge that this second set of objections 
is stronger than the previous one, these views will not support the objectionable ex 
ante rules.  
                                               
25 Here my response follows Kumar (2015, 36–37). 
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We can then return to the main dialectic. I have argued in this section that the 
risk-acknowledging versions of ex post contractualism are more plausible than the 
previous ex post views. All these versions of contractualism share the same advantages 
of ex post contractualism but only the risk-acknowledging versions can avoid the 
implausible conclusions in the different harm and social risk imposition cases.  
How do the risk-acknowledging ex post views then compare to ex ante 
contractualism? At this point, both views seem equally plausible because both views 
are extensionally equivalent in the discussed different harm cases and social risk 
imposition cases.26 I have just argued that risk-acknowledging ex post contractualism 
can avoid the Argument from Irrelevant Information and the Problem of Ex Ante 
Rules. However, I also mentioned in §4.1 that Frick too has argued that his version of 
ex ante contractualism can avoid those objections too. Given that I have not criticised 
his responses to those objections, it seems like the conclusion should be that ex ante 
contractualism and risk-acknowledging ex post contractualism are just as plausible.  
However, Frick (2014, §7–§9) himself introduced a type of cases that pose a 
serious challenge even for his own version of ex ante contractualism. The next section 
suggests that, in these cases, risk-acknowledging ex post contractualism can do better 
                                               
26 In Lenman’s (2008, 116) words, at this point we might then ‘think of these approaches as 
complementary rather than necessarily competing’. However, the next section argues that the two 
approaches in fact lead to different conclusions in some cases. 
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than ex ante contractualism and so these cases provide us with at least some reason to 
prefer the outlined new proposal. 
5. Identified vs. Statistical Lives 
Let us then finally consider the following case from Frick (2015, 212):  
Miners (1vs. 100): Gareth, a miner, is trapped in a collapsed shaft. If we do not 
save him, he is virtually certain to die within days. However, a rescue will be 
costly. Suppose we have to choose between the following two options:  
• Rescue: Spend all our available funds to rescue Gareth. 
• Prevention: Spend our available funds to improve the safety at this point, 
reducing the risk of future accidents. If we choose this option, the risk of 
death for each of the other 100 people working at this mine of dying in a 
future accident will be reduced from 3 percent to 1 percent. We expect 
that this will save two lives (though we cannot know which). However, 
Gareth will die. 
Frick argues that this type of an identified vs. statistical lives case poses a serious 
challenge for ex ante contractualism.  
We can start by comparing Gareth’s objection to Prevention to one of the other 
miner’s objection to Rescue. Frick assumes that, even from the ex ante perspective, 
Gareth can object to Prevention on the basis of his own death. As Frick puts it, the 
35 
 
natural veil of ignorance imposed by the ex ante perspective does not cover the 
outcome of Prevention for Gareth in this case (Frick 2015, 213–214). In comparison, 
each one of the miners can make only a much weaker objection to Rescue from the ex 
ante perspective. From this perspective, they can only object to the relevant rescue 
raising their chance of being killed from 1% to 3%. Because this objection is much 
weaker than Gareth’s objection to Prevention based on his own death, Rescue is the 
non-rejectable policy here for ex ante contractualism. 
The problem, however, is that, if we add more miners to the case, ex ante 
contractualism still entails the same conclusion (Frick 2015, §8). So, consider Miners (1 
vs. 1.000.000) case, which is exactly like the previous one except expect now there are 
million miners. In this case, lowering the risk from 3% to 1% by taking the relevant 
preventive measures saves 20.000 lives. This makes it harder to conclude that we 
should choose Prevention instead of Rescue. Yet, ex ante contractualism entails that 
very conclusion: it again compares Gareth’s death to the slightly higher risk of death 
for one miner and concludes that Gareth has a more serious objection. Because of this, 
Frick concluded that ex ante contractualists must recognise also other right-making 
qualities of actions such as the ones grounded in the well-being of others (Frick 2015, 
§9). According to the resulting view, even if we owe it to Gareth that we save him 
because we should be able to justify our actions to him on grounds he could not 
reasonably reject, we should not rescue him in Miners (1 vs. 1.000.000) all things 
considered because of how many lives would be otherwise lost. 
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Frick argues that ex post contractualism has the opposite problem (2015, 214). It 
can explain why we should choose Prevention in Miners (1 vs. 1.000.000) but not why 
we should choose Rescue in Miners (1 vs. 100). In both cases, from the ex post 
perspective, Gareth’s death-based objection to Prevention matches exactly the 
personal objections that the unlucky miners have to Prevention. In this situation where 
the strongest objections to both alternatives are equally strong, Scanlon relied on the 
so-called Tie Break Argument to argue that the non-rejectable principle is the one to 
which the smallest possible number of individuals can make the most serious 
objection (232). This would make Prevention the non-rejectable principle in both 
cases.27    
Let me finish by outlining how the defenders of risk-acknowledging ex post 
contractualism could argue that, even if Rescue is the right policy in Miners (1 vs. 100), 
Prevention is the correct one in Miners (1 vs. 1.000.000). Let us begin from the 
observation that there is one generic reason, which Frick’s discussion of ex post 
contractualism seems to have ignored in this context. 
According to Scanlon (204), individuals can object to a principle on the grounds 
that living under that principle makes it impossible for them to rely on the assurances of 
                                               
27 As Rüger (2018, 255–256) correctly points out, Frick is wrong to think that ex post contractualism is 
any worse off at this point than his own ex ante view. Frick thinks that ex ante contractualists can avoid 
the problem here by relying on other wrong-making features of actions than the ones based on what 
we owe to others. Yet, if the ex ante contractualists are allowed to do this, then surely ex post 
contractualists too can rely on a similar pluralist strategy in the Miners (1 vs. 100) to explain why the 
identified individual should be saved in them. 
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others. It is then important to notice that one important assurance we give to others is 
that we will help them when they urgently need help – that ‘they have our back’. We 
often give this type of reciprocal assurances to each other both explicitly and 
implicitly. After all, the bonds that these particular fundamental assurances create 
between us are what binds our communities and relationships together. It is not even 
difficult to imagine how the natural inclination for offering and asking for these sorts 
of assurances might have an evolutionary origin.  
Yet, under Prevention, individuals cannot rely on the assurances of others. 
Instead of rescuing the identified individuals who urgently need help, others will 
simply use the required resources for preventing accidents in the future. This is why, 
from Gareth’s own ex post perspective, Gareth can object, not merely on the basis of 
his own death, but also on the basis of not being able to rely on the assurances of 
others. He has to suffer an additional burden of just being left to die when others could 
have helped him as they have assured him they would do. In contrast, the unlucky 
individuals who die because certain preventive measures were not adopted in the past 
do not have a corresponding objection – they die merely as a result of an accident.28 
Thus, if in Miners (1 vs. 100) we intrapersonally aggregate Gareth’s objection based 
on his own death and his inability to rely on the assurances of others, Gareth’s 
personal objection to Prevention will be stronger than the personal objections of the 
hundred miners to Rescue that are based only on their death.  
                                               
28 On this point, see (236). 
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Ex post contractualism thus leads to exactly the same conclusion as ex ante 
contractualism in Miners (1 vs. 100). It may also look like ex post contractualism suffers 
from the same problem as that view – it seems to vindicate Rescue in Miners (1 vs. 
1.000.000) too. In that case, it could be argued that, whereas from the ex post 
perspective Gareth can object to both his own death and his inability to rely on the 
assurances of others, the 20.000 miners who die under Rescue can only object to their 
own accidental death.  
However, the risk-acknowledging element of the proposal outlined above seems 
to enable ex post contractualism to do better here. Consider the more general principles 
that would require Prevention in Miners (1 vs. 1.000.000). According to such 
principles, we should always use our resources to save identified individuals even 
when the cost of doing is so high that tens of thousands of people die accidentally 
because we cannot afford to take any precautions. Under these principles then, 
individuals are sometimes saved in a very costly way from death even when many, 
many more people will die accidentally. It then seems like a significant risk is imposed 
on every individual living under these principles.  
Consider then, from an ex post perspective, one of the 20.000 miners who die 
because Rescue is adopted to govern cases like Miners (1 vs. 1.000.000). This individual 
can object, not only on the basis of his or her own accidental death, but also because 
such a serious risk of accidental death was imposed on him or her throughout his or 
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her life.29 Risk-acknowledging ex post contractualists can then argue that this combined 
objection based on death and the imposition of a serious risk outweighs Gareth’s 
objection based on both his death and inability to rely on the assurances of others.  
This view could still continue to support the intuitive conclusion that we 
should rescue Gareth in Miners (1 vs. 100). This is because the general principle that 
supports Rescue when the number of people under the threat of accidental future 
death is small does not significantly increase the risks that are imposed on you. After 
all, that particular type of a limited Rescue principle only leads to few extra deaths in 
only the few rare cases in which you have to choose between saving an identified 
individual and taking precautions that would save just a couple of lives. Living under 
that Rescue principle cannot be very dangerous for anyone. As a result, in Miners (1 
vs. 100) Gareth’s objection to Prevention based on his death and inability to rely on 
the assurances of others can outweigh the personal objections of the 2 miners who die 
under Rescue (based on their death and the slightly increased risk that they have had 
to live under).  
                                               
29 Here we need to recall that the principle that is to govern this case is to govern also all other cases in 
which we must compare whether to save an identified individual in a costly way or use the resources 
to take preventive measures that will save a large number of lives in the future. As Frick (2015, 178–
179) points out, we cannot assume that any individual would be a victim of the relevant future accidents 
many times. Yet, living under the principles that use all resources to saving identified victims rather 
than taking any preventive measures will be risky because the risks imposed by all choices of this type 
will aggregative intrapersonally. Under these principles, any individual will face many situations that 
are dangerous because it’s never the case that the society takes the required steps to prevent accidents. 
For a discussion, see Rüger (2018, 254).  
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This means that there is a version of risk-acknowledging ex post contractualism 
that can come to the right conclusions in both Miners (1 vs. 100) and Miners (1 vs. 
1.000.000). In the former case, this view relies on Gareth’s inability to rely on the 
assurances of others as a tie-breaker between the relevant death-based objections 
whereas in the latter case it recognises that death and the serious risks imposed by too 
extensive Rescue principles together outweigh even the previous combined objection. 
Unlike the defenders of Frick’s ex ante contractualism, the defenders of this view need 
not rely on any other non-contractualist right-making features to give an account of 
these cases. This is why, other things being equal, risk-acknowledging ex post 
contractualism seems a more promising approach. 
6. Conclusion 
Let me then summarise. All contractualist views determine what is right and wrong 
by comparing personal objections to the moral principles which we could adopt 
together. Yet, there is a serious disagreement over from which temporal perspective 
these objections are to be made: are they made on the basis of the prospects the 
principles give to different individuals or on the basis of what kind of lives different 
individuals eventually come to live under them? 
Both alternatives have their problems. The ex ante views are threatened by the 
Argument from Irrelevant Information and the Problem of Ex Ante Rules, whereas the 
ex post views seem to have counterintuitive consequences in the different harm and 
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social risk imposition cases. In this article, I have outlined a synthesis of the two views 
called ‘risk-acknowledging ex post contractualism’. I have argued that this view avoids 
the objections to the previous contractualist views in this context and it can also do 
even better than Frick’s ex ante contractualism in his own identified vs. statistical lives 
cases. This is why I believe that my proposal is the most promising form of 
contractualism in this debate. 
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